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Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀect of organizational and technological changes on job
stability of diﬀerent occupations in France. We ﬁrst develop a basic matching model with
endogenous job destruction. It provides a structure to the empirical analysis, where we
extensively exploit a unique data set on a representative sample of French establishments.
The adoption of information technologies is positively correlated to labor ﬂows of blue collar
workers while most of the new workplace organizational practices positively inﬂuence the
managers’ turnover.
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11 Introduction
The consequences of the information and communication technologies (ICT) revolution have
been largely analyzed by the economic literature. While authors like Berman, Bound, and
Griliches (1994), Fitz Roy and Funke (1995), Machin, Ryan, and Van Reenen (1998), Krusell
et al. (2000) or Moreno-Galbis (2002) claim that the capital-skill complementarity relationship
is at the origin of the observed skill-biased technological change, other authors, like Caroli
and Van Reenen (2001) argue that it is the internal re-organization of ﬁrms following ICT
adoption that has been skill-biased. Nowadays, there is an increasing agreement about the
existence of a complementary relationship between ICT adoption, inside organizational changes
of ﬁrms and skills (see Askenazy and Gianella (2000), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002)
Cappelli (1996), Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) and Greenan (1996)). The introduction of ICT
is, thus, necessarily associated with changes in the organizational and skill infrastructure of the
establishments.
In spite of the rich literature on the eﬀects of the ICT revolution, there is still not much evidence
about its consequences for job quality. However, when comparing the scarce available data about
the introduction of ICT and high performance workplace organizational (HPWO) practices (such
as delayering1, team work, decentralization of decision making within ﬁrms, quality control,
Total Quality Management) with the also non abundant data concerning the workers’ feeling
on job stability2, we observe that, in most European countries, new technologies and innovative
organizational practices adoption seems associated with an increased feeling of job instability
by workers (see tables 1 and 2). The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical contribution
to the recent and scarce, but growing, literature on this topic.
There are numerous works dealing with labor and job ﬂows, e.g., Burgess and Nickell (1990) for
the UK, Hamermesh, Hassink, and Van-Ours (1996) for the Netherlands, Burgess, Lane, and
1Delegating responsibilities to lower hierarchical levels inside the ﬁrm by removing one or more managerial
levels.
2It would be more interesting to compare the adoption of ICT and HPWO practices with the evolution of job
turnover, however the available data on this variable concerns, for most European countries, the average values
of job turnover between the mid-eighties and the beginning of the nineties (see OECD (1996) table 5.1 page 176),
therefore we cannot analyze its evolution.
2Stevens (2000), Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen (1999), Neumark and Reed (2004) or Valletta
(1999) for the US, Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2003) for Finland, Bauer and Bender (2004) for
Germany and Abowd and Kramarz (2003) or Givord and Maurin (2004) for France. However,
very few analyze the eﬀects that the introduction of ICT and HPWO practices over the last
decade may have had on these ﬂows. Some of the papers dealing with this topic are Michelacci
and Lopez-Salido (2004), who develop a theoretical approach in which they decompose low-
frequency movements in labor productivity into an investment-neutral and investment-speciﬁc
technology component. They ﬁnd that, while neutral technology shocks increase job creation
and job destruction (reducing aggregate employment), investment speciﬁc shocks increase job




1980 1990 2000 Task Working Higher Reduction
rotation teams worker implication in hierarchy
Belgium .. .. 12 .. .. .. ..
France 6.1 8.5 13.1 6 30 44 21
Germany 7.7 13.9 19.2 7 20 19 30
Italy 8.0 14.2 16.7 13 28 24 10
Netherlands 11.2 15.5 20.9 9 9 46 47
Spain 5.6 11.9 10.1 14 34 33 ..
United Kingdom 5.6 13.8 22.0 13 33 48 45
United States 15.2 22.5 31.4 .. .. .. ..
1. Percentage of non residual gross ﬁxed capital formation, total economy. ICT equipment is deﬁned as computer and oﬃce
equipment and communication equipment; software includes both purchased and own account software.
2. Percentage of establishments stating in 1996 some of the HPWO practices adopted by their employers during the three
previous years (concerning Italy data refers to the three previous months).
.. Unavailable data.
Source concerning ICT: OECD estimates based on national accounts.
Source concerning HPWO: OECD Employment Outlook 1999, table 4.4, page 206.
Table 1: ICT investment and adopted HPWO practices in some OECD countries.
On the empirical side, Bauer and Bender (2004), working with a German employer-employee
matched panel data set, examine the impact of ICT and HPWO practices on gross job and








United Kingdom 66.9 -22*
United States .. ..
1. Percentage of workers being in total disagreement with the statement my job is ensured.
2. Evolution in percentage points in the proportion of workers considering their job ensured.
.. Unavailable data. * Signiﬁcant evolution.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997, table 5.2, page 148, and table 5.3, page 149.
Table 2: Job instability in OECD countries.
worker ﬂows. The authors conclude that the organizational change is skill-biased since it leads
to higher job destruction and separation rates for low- and medium-skilled workers, while em-
ployment patterns of the high-skilled are not aﬀected signiﬁcantly. They also ﬁnd that new
technologies do not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on gross job and workers ﬂows. Neumark and Reed
(2004), working with US data, estimate a positive link between new economy jobs, deﬁned ei-
ther as employment in high-tech cities or as industry employment growth, and contingent3 or
alternative4 employment relationships. Jones, Kato, and Weinberg (2003) implement a case
study over ten US manufacturing establishments in order to determine how the quality of jobs is
aﬀected by the managerial decision on business strategy. They conclude that in medium sized-
establishment located in depressed areas and with workers of low-educational level, the proper
adoption of HPWO practices can yield favorable worker outcomes: workers are more empowered,
satisﬁed, committed, trusting, communicative and hardworking. Moreover, on the basis of the
European Survey on Working Conditions, Bauer (2004) also ﬁnds that higher involvement in
3A contingent worker is deﬁned as an individual holding a job that is temporary by its nature.
4Alternative employment arrangements are: independent contractors, on-call workers, temporary help agency
workers and workers provided by contract ﬁrms.
4HPWO practices is associated with higher job satisfaction. Finally, Givord and Maurin (2004),
using the French Labor Force Survey, develop an econometric analysis that tries to identify the
structural factors that have driven the upturn in the risk of involuntary job loss experienced
by French workers over the last 20 years. They conclude that technological change seems to
be at the origin of the increased job insecurity, but its eﬀect may be mitigated by institutional
changes.
Our paper explores the impact of new technologies and new organizational practices on the
labor ﬂows of diﬀerent professional categories in France. The paper is divided in two interrelated
parts. The ﬁrst part develops a simple theoretical model providing a structure that facilitates the
comprehension of the empirical analysis developed in the second part. Since we are concerned
about the eﬀects of new technologies and innovative organizational practices on the labor ﬂows,
we try to embed these features in a basic theoretical setup. The Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) endogenous job destruction model provides an appropriate framework to do so. More
particularly, we consider a perfectly segmented labor market where we distinguish between
complex jobs, occupied by high-skilled workers and simple jobs, occupied by low-skilled workers.
Each type of job is characterized by a constant productivity component which is modiﬁed in
case of biased technological or organizational changes.
In the second part of the paper we implement an empirical analysis. We use a database re-
sulting from merging two French surveys conducted in 1999 and covering more than twenty-ﬁve
hundred establishments: the REPONSE survey (RElations PrOfessionnelles et N´ egociationS
d’Entreprise), which describes the use of new technologies and innovative organizational prac-
tices by the establishment, and the DMMO survey (D´ eclaration Mensuelle de Mouvements de
main d’Oeuvre), describing the gross labor and job ﬂows (entries, exits, job creations and de-
structions, etc.) in the establishment by gender, age, professional category, etc. We estimate the
eﬀects of ICT and HPWO practices on the labor ﬂows of diﬀerent categories of workers. Results
reveal that the turnover of blue collars is positively aﬀected by ICT adoption and negatively by
the introduction of some of the HPWO practices. In contrast, labor ﬂows of white collars are
positively related to HPWO practices. Our approach is focused on the total number of move-
ments (entries + exits) by professional categories while the analysis developed in Bauer and
5Bender (2004) estimated job creation and destruction patterns for diﬀerent skill groups inside
plants. Findings in both studies can, thus, be considered as complementary.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic theoretical model providing the
structure for our core empirical analysis. The comparative static analysis reveals that the
introduction of any technological or organizational change relatively favoring the productivity
of white collars stimulates labor ﬂows of blue collars. In contrast any change favoring the relative
productivity of blue collar workers increases the turnover of white collars. Section 3 describes
both the data surveys and the data itself. Section 4 details the econometric analysis developed
in the paper. Results are explained in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 A simple model
2.1 Assumptions
We develop a simple model giving a theoretical foundation to the eﬀects of ICT and HPWO
practices on labor ﬂows. This theoretical setup is inspired from a discrete version of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), developed in Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) for the case of one ﬁrm
oﬀering diﬀerent types of contracts to homogenous workers. Here we assume two types of
competitive ﬁrms employing labor as a unique input:
² Firms producing complex goods only employ high-skilled workers since the production of
these goods involves complex tasks requiring a high-skill qualiﬁcation.
² Firms producing simple goods only employ low-skilled workers since their production pro-
cess involves simpler tasks.
We have therefore completely segmented labor markets, where high-skilled workers only occupy
complex jobs and low-skilled workers only simple jobs (no job competition). Moreover we assume
a one-job-one-ﬁrm framework. Both assumptions allow to simplify the theoretical model, which
roughly tries to provide an intuitive understanding of the economic mechanisms underlying
behind the empirical results. Generalizing the model to the case where job competition is allowed
or when the ﬁrm oﬀers several jobs, will complicate the analytical results without improving the
comprehension of the empirical part.
6When the ﬁrm opens a vacancy, it can be ﬁlled, and the ﬁrm starts producing, or it can remain
empty and the ﬁrm continues searching. Any job that is not producing or searching is destroyed
(job destruction). In contrast, a job is created when a ﬁrm with a vacant job and a worker
meet and both decide to start producing (it is mutually proﬁtable to produce). The number
of complex and simple contacts per period (Mc
t and Ms
t ) is respectively represented by the










t represent the number of complex and simple vacancies and uh
t and ul
t the number
of high- and low-skilled unemployed.
















The probabilities of ﬁlling a complex and a simple job vacancy are respectively decreasing in #c
t
and #s













With linear homogeneous matching functions, the probabilities of ﬁnding a complex or a simple















The complex job is associated to a ﬁxed coeﬃcients technology requiring one high-skilled worker
to produce "+h1 units of output in period t. The simple job is associated to a ﬁxed coeﬃcients
technology requiring one low-skilled worker to produce " + h2 units of output in period t. The
term " is a random idiosyncratic productivity parameter that is the same whether we are consid-
ering complex or simple jobs. All the values of " are drawn from the distribution Á = Φ0 over the
interval [";"]. The process that changes this idiosyncratic term is the same in the complex and
the simple segment, and it follows a Poisson distribution with arrival rate ¸ ² [0;1]. Therefore,
there exists a probability ¸ that the economy is hit by a shock such that a new value of " has
to be drawn from Á.
7The terms h1 et h2 are interpreted as the positive constant productivity component speciﬁc to
each production sector (complex or simple). We impose them to add up to one (h1 + h2 = 1)
which implies that improvements in the productivity of one sector go against the productiv-
ity in the other sector5. This assumption can be better justiﬁed if we think in terms of the
skill-premium. During the last decades the progressive adoption of new technologies and orga-
nizational practices has run in parallel with the rise in wage inequalities (see, for example, Davis
and Haltiwanger (1991) or Krusell et al. (2000) for the U.S. and Kramarz, Lollivier, and Pel´ e
(1996) for France). The improvement in the high-skilled workers’ wage premium is interpreted
as an improvement in their relative productivity, which implies a deterioration in the low-skilled
relative productivity. Imposing h1+h2 = 1 permits to capture this fact and facilitates the anal-
ysis of the eﬀects that diﬀerent biased shocks (favoring the productivity of one type of worker
and going against the productivity of the other type of worker) have on the labor ﬂows of each
labor market segment.
It is important to notice that all job contacts do not lead to a job creation, since the match may
not be productive enough. The initial productivity level " + h1 (or " + h2) is revealed to the
ﬁrm and the worker immediately after the match is formed. Because search and hiring activities
are costly, the productivity level may be too low to compensate either party for their eﬀorts.
Therefore, there exists a productivity level, called reservation productivity and denoted "c for
the complex segment and "s for the simple one, below which it is not in the interest of the ﬁrm
and the worker to trade.
2.2 Concepts and notation
An open vacancy can remain empty and searching or be ﬁlled and start producing. The associ-
ated asset value to each of these situations is represented by Πvc
(resp. Πvs
) when the complex
(resp. simple) vacancy is empty and by Πc(") (resp. Πs(")) when the complex (resp. simple)
vacancy is ﬁlled. In the same way, the value to the worker in a complex (resp. simple) job is
denoted as V c(") (resp. V s(")). Finally, the average expected return on the high-skilled (resp.
5Notice that, the smaller the deterministic productivity component (h1 or h2) the more important is the share
of the idiosyncratic component (") in total productivity, meaning that the agents heterogeneity (represented by
") will have the prominent role.
8low-skilled) worker’s human capital when looking for a job is represented by V uh
(V ul
).
Since search and hiring activities are costly, when a match is formed a joint surplus is generated:
Sc(") = Πc(") ¡ Πvc
+ V c(") ¡ V uh
Joint surplus in a complex job.
Ss(") = Πs(") ¡ Πvs
+ V s(") ¡ V ul
Joint surplus in a simple job.
At the beginning of every period the ﬁrm and the employee renegotiate wages through a Nash
bargaining process, that splits the joint surplus into ﬁxed proportions at all times. Denoting as
´ ² [0;1] the bargaining power6 of workers (whether they are in complex or simple positions),
we have that:
Πc(") ¡ Πvc
= (1 ¡ ´) Sc(") or V c(") ¡ V uh
= ´ Sc(") ; (5)
Πs(") ¡ Πvs
= (1 ¡ ´) Ss(") or V s(") ¡ V ul
= ´ Ss(") : (6)
When a ﬁrm producing a complex good opens a vacancy it has to support a cost ac per unit of
time. When a ﬁrm producing a simple good opens a vacancy it has to support a cost as per unit
of time. There is a probability 1 ¡ q(#c) and 1 ¡ q(#s) that the complex and simple vacancy,
respectively, remain empty next period. On the opposite, there is a probability q(#c) and q(#s)
that the complex and the simple vacancies get ﬁlled. The asset value associated to a searching
vacancy is then:
Πvc





] dΦ(x) ; (7)
Πvs





] dΦ(x) : (8)
where ¯ is the discount factor.
When the vacancy is ﬁlled and actively producing, we know that there is a probability ¸ that
the job is hit by a shock, so that a new value of " is drawn from the distribution Á. The asset
values associated to the complex and simple jobs are respectively:
Πc(") = " + h1 ¡ wc(") + ¯ (1 ¡ ¸) Max[Πc(");Πv
c





] dΦ(x) ; (9)
Πs(") = " + h2 ¡ ws(") + ¯ (1 ¡ ¸) Max[Πs(");Πv
s





] dΦ(x) ; (10)
6For proofs we will exclude the extreme cases ´ = 0 and ´ = 1.
9where wc(") and ws(") represent, respectively, the wages paid to a high- and a low-skilled worker.
Independently of her skills, an unemployed worker receives a ﬂow of earnings wu including
unemployment beneﬁts, leisure, etc. The high-skilled job seeker comes in contact with a complex
vacant slot at rate #cq(#c) while the low-skilled comes in contact with a simple vacancy at rate
#sq(#s). The value to the workers of unemployment is given by:
V uh












] dΦ(x) : (12)
As just mentioned, a complex job with productivity " + h1 pays a wage wc(") to the worker,
while a simple job with productivity "+h2 pays ws("). Both types of jobs are hit by a shock with
probability ¸ (aggregate shock aﬀecting all market segments). The present value of a complex
and a simple job to the worker solve:
V c(") = wc(") + ¯ (1 ¡ ¸) Max[V c(");V uh




] dΦ(x) ; (13)
V s(") = ws(") + ¯ (1 ¡ ¸) Max[V s(");V ul




] dΦ(x) : (14)
2.3 Job creation and job destruction
We develop in detail the calculus of the steady state in appendix A. This section presents the
equilibrium job creation and job destruction rules obtained for each labor market segment. Job
creation rules of the complex and simple segments are deﬁned as:
ac
¯(1 ¡ ´) q(#c)
=
1
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
Z "
"c
(1 ¡ Φ(x)) dx ; (15)
as
¯(1 ¡ ´) q(#s)
=
1
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
Z "
"s
(1 ¡ Φ(x)) dx ; (16)
where, both equations determine a negative relationship between market tightness and ", mean-
ing that the job creation curves are negatively sloped in the space (#i;") for i = c;s.
Complex and simple job destruction rules are given by:
´ ac #c
1 ¡ ´
= "c + h1 ¡ wu +
¯ ¸
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
Z "
"c
(1 ¡ Φ(x)) dx ; (17)
´ as #s
1 ¡ ´
= "s + h2 ¡ wu +
¯ ¸
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
Z "
"s
(1 ¡ Φ(x)) dx : (18)
10As proved in the appendix both curves are positively sloped in the space (#c;") and (#s;"),
respectively.
2.4 Comparative static analysis
We analyze now the variations in job creation and job destruction predicted by the model
when some exogenous biased shocks modify the speciﬁc productivity component of each sector.
Empirical evidence suggests that, technological and organizational changes aﬀect diﬀerently the
turnover of each professional category. Introducing biased shocks in our theoretical setup seems
an appropriate way to investigate the mechanisms underlying behind these empirical ﬁndings.
Depending on the values of h1;h2;#c;#s;ac and as, we might have an initial situation where the
reservation productivity levels are such that: "c > "s or "c < "s or "c = "s. However, since the
objective of the static comparative analysis we implement is to determine the variation (increase
or decrease) in the turnover of complex and simple jobs, the initial situation is not relevant for
the exercise. We focus on the eﬀects of technological and organizational biased changes in each
market segment separately.
Let’s start the comparative static analysis considering the technological shocks:
² We assume ﬁrst an exogenous shock consisting in a technological revolution. Evidence
has shown that ICT adoption by an economy clearly favors the productivity of high-
skilled workers since the eﬃcient use of these new machines requires qualiﬁed staﬀ (see
Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), Fitz Roy and Funke (1995) or Machin, Ryan, and
Van Reenen (1998) for evidence on the existence of complementarities between skilled
workers and technological capital). Because complex jobs are occupied by high-skilled
workers their speciﬁc productivity component (h1) is likely to be improved. In contrast,
the productivity in simple jobs (h2) deteriorates since new technologies cannot be eﬃciently
used. We expect, thus, an upturn in the turnover of simple jobs with respect to the initial































Figure 1: Shock increasing the speciﬁc productivity component of complex jobs.
More formally, the complex job destruction curve shifts down7 (see ﬁgure 1) determining
a lower reservation equilibrium value8 "c0
("c0
< "c). In the simple sector the evolution
is the opposite9 leading to a higher equilibrium reservation productivity ("s0
> "s). In
this new situation, the turnover of complex jobs is necessarily reduced since, in case of
an idiosyncratic shock over ", the new value b " drawn from the distribution Á, might be
such that "c0
< b " < "c. Therefore, some jobs that would have been destroyed in the initial
situation, are not destroyed now that the speciﬁc productivity component of complex
jobs has increased and the reservation productivity decreased. On the contrary, in the
simple segment job turnover is stimulated since the reduction of the speciﬁc productivity
component determines a higher equilibrium reservation productivity (we might have a
situation where "s0
> b " > "s).
² We assume that both economic sectors adopt a traditional tayloristic production system.
Such a change is likely to improve mainly the marginal productivity of blue collar workers
(simple jobs) since they are the users of this kind of technologies. Because white collar
workers are non production workers, their productivity is probably not aﬀected by the
chain production system. Relative productivity of blue collar workers is thus ameliorated








1¡¯ (1¡¸ Φ("c)) < 0.
8Notice that, contrarily to what stated in Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), the movement takes place along the









1¡¯ (1¡¸ Φ("s)) < 0.
12shifts right, determining a lower equilibrium reservation productivity10 in this market
("s0
< "s), while in the complex segment the job destruction curve moves upward leading
to a higher reservation productivity ("c0
> "c). In this new equilibrium, we require a
stronger idiosyncratic shock over ", with respect to the initial situation, to have simple
jobs destroyed. On the contrary the idiosyncratic shock required to destroy complex jobs
is now weaker. The turnover of blue collars is, thus, reduced and that of white collars
increased.
In sum, technological shocks stimulate turnover in the labor market segment (complex or simple)
whose speciﬁc productivity component is negatively aﬀected by the shock, while turnover falls
in the segment with an improved relative productivity.
The static comparative analysis concerning the introduction of HPWO practices follows the
same reasoning. Notice that some of these practices (such as the autonomous teams of produc-
tion, multidisciplinary or project working groups, delayering, etc.) imply the existence of more
than one worker inside a ﬁrm, whereas we have assumed a one-job-one-ﬁrm theoretical setup.
However, as far as we manage to determine how the productivity of each type of job (h1 for
complex jobs and h2 for simple jobs) is aﬀected by the corresponding organizational practice, the
theoretical model is able to predict the evolution of the turnover in each sector. This will permit
to understand the economic mechanism acting behind the labor ﬂows. We brieﬂy comment the
consequences of some HPWO practices on the turnover of complex and simple jobs:
² Most of the innovative organizational practices implemented by ﬁrms are targeted to in-
crease the autonomy and the responsibility of production workers, either through the
creation of autonomous teams of production and project groups, either through delay-
ering (delegating responsibilities to lower hierarchical levels inside the ﬁrm by removing
one or more managerial levels). As Jones, Kato, and Weinberg (2003) show, these new
organizational practices permit low-skilled workers to get more empowered with the ﬁrm,
more satisﬁed, more committed and trusting in the managerial structure as well as more
hardworking. Moreover, according to Bauer (2004) higher involvement in HPWO practices































Figure 2: Shock increasing the speciﬁc productivity component of simple jobs.
leads to a higher job satisfaction. Existing evidence in the U.S. (e.g., Jones, Kato, and
Weinberg (2003)) and Europe (e.g., Bauer (2004)) suggests, thus, that such organizational
practices should improve the speciﬁc productivity component of low-skilled workers in
simple jobs (h2). Regarding skilled workers, Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) show that, in
France, delayering has mainly favored skilled manual workers. With respect to high-skilled
in complex jobs, Bauer (2004) ﬁnds that higher involvement in innovative organizational
practices should increase their job satisfaction, however, up to our knowledge, there is no
evidence about the eﬀects on their productivity (h1). Depending on how strong the eﬀect
of HPWO practices is on the absolute productivity of high-skilled workers on complex
jobs, we may have a situation where the turnover is reduced in the simple segment and
augmented in the complex segment (h1=h2 decreases. Figure 2) or the opposite (h1=h2
increases. Figure 1).
² The rotation of workers among diﬀerent tasks or the just in time production practices inside
ﬁrms are more likely to aﬀect production workers (simple sector) rather than managers
(complex sector). The main objective of such practices is not simply to form workers with
more ﬂexible abilities allowing ﬁrms to easily adapt to market demand changes, but also
to avoid workers loosing motivation due to repetitive tasks (see Jones, Kato, and Weinberg
(2003)). The adoption of the rotation or the just in time production systems is then likely
to stimulate the relative speciﬁc productivity component of simple jobs, reducing in this
way their turnover. On the contrary, the turnover of high-skilled workers should increase
(ﬁgure 2).
14² Another commonly used HPWO practice consists in implementing total quality control
procedures. The consequences of this practice over the relative productivity are diﬃcult
to predict since these procedures normally require qualiﬁed staﬀ to be implemented (h1=h2
should increase) but, at the same time, they are targeted to improve the eﬃciency of the
production process: h2=h1 should also raise (Evans and Dean (2003)). On the other hand,
total quality seems to increase wage inequality, suggesting h1=h2 is improved (e.g. Cappelli
(1996)).
3 The data
The database used results from merging two French surveys conducted in 1993 and 1999, re-
ferring to 1992 and 1998, respectively: the REPONSE survey (RElations PrOfessionnelles et
N´ egociationS d’Entreprise) and the DMMO survey (D´ eclaration Mensuelle de Mouvements de
main d’Oeuvre).
In REPONSE more than twenty-ﬁve hundred establishments were surveyed with senior man-
agers being asked about the economic situation of the establishment, its internal organization,
technological changes, the wage negotiation with unions and conﬂicts with workers. Only estab-
lishments with 20 or more employees were sampled and no public sector employees were included
(except workers in state-owned industries). Concerning ICT and HPWO practices, managers
were asked either about their presence in the establishment (1993 and 1999 waves) or about
the proportion of workers beneﬁtting from the corresponding technology or workplace practice
(1999 wave). The REPONSE survey, which is also used in Caroli and Van Reenen (2001),
contains, actually, detailed information on the technological and organizational practices of a
representative sample of French establishments.
In the DMMO survey, each establishment with at least 50 employees makes a monthly declaration
of the beginning-of-the-month employment, end-of-the-month employment and the total entries
and exits within the month. Furthermore, the respondent establishment reports the nature of
the employment transaction (type of contract of the new entries and reasons for the exit), as
well as the skill level, age and seniority of the employee involved in this transaction.
15This paper considers the eﬀects of diﬀerent technological and organizational variables on the
labor ﬂows of diﬀerent professional categories (managers, intermediary professions, employees
and manual workers) as well as on the turnover of all workers, women workers and men workers.
Since the REPONSE survey and the DMMO survey were both conducted also in 1993, there
does exist a small panel referring to 1992 and 1998. Unfortunately its reduced size and the highly
probably presence of a bias leads to meaningless estimations. We use a cross section referred
to 1998 that provides the most detailed information concerning ICT and HPWO practices. We
explain below the variables used in the econometric analysis.
3.1 Labor ﬂows
The variables capturing the labor ﬂows of diﬀerent professional categories are deﬁned as follows:
² MANAGERS=(Number of movements of managers in the establishment)/Total number
of managers in the establishment. The managers professional category covers all executive
and managerial positions inside the establishment.
² INT. PROFES.=(Number of movements of intermediary professionals in the establish-
ment)/Total number of intermediary professionals in the establishment. The intermediary
professions refer to technicians and foremen.
² EMPLOYEES=(Number of movements of employees in the establishment)/Total number
of employees in the establishment. The employees category includes clerks, oﬃce workers
and business employees.
² WORKERS=(Number of movements of manual workers in the establishment)/Total num-
ber of manual workers in the establishment. This category covers manual workers whether
they are qualiﬁed or not.
² TOTAL=(Number of movements of all the workers in the establishment)/Total number
of workers in the establishment.
² WOMEN=(Number of movements of women in the establishment)/Total number of women
in the establishment.
16² MEN=(Number of movements of men in the establishment)/Total number of men in the
establishment.
Because the number of movements is deﬁned as the sum of entries and exits, the previous
variables may adopt values going from 0 to +1.
3.2 Technological variables
New technologies, specially ICT, are widely spread on French establishments, therefore we con-
sider three technological variables:
² COMPUTER: It is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if 50% or more workers use a
computer.
² NET: It is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if between 20 and 50% of the workers use
a network system (e.g., intranet).
² INTERNET: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if between 20 and 50% of the workers
use the internet.
In addition, automated production is captured by the variable:
² CHAIN: It is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the establishment still uses
tayloristic production systems (robots, computer assisted systems, etc.).
3.3 Organizational variables
To measure the eﬀects of HPWO practices we consider six diﬀerent variables:
² AUTONOMOUS: It is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if between 20 and 50% of the
workers participate in autonomous teams of production.
² PROJECT: It is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if between 20 and 50% of the workers
participate in multidisciplinary working groups or project groups.
² ROTATION: It is a dummy variable capturing whether the majority of workers rotates
among tasks inside the establishment or not.
17² QUALITY: It is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the establishment implements
internal total quality control procedures.
² HIERARCHY: It is a dummy variable capturing whether the establishment has reduced the
number of hierarchical levels and has adopted organizational practices trying to promote
the participation of workers in the internal decisions of the establishment.
² J.I.T.: It is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the establishment practices just in
time production methods.
3.4 Other variables
In the regressions we control for other variables that can aﬀect labor ﬂows, such as the presence of
unions in the establishment, the arrival of an important technological change over the last three
years, an unusual variation in the economic activity, the size of the establishment, the economic
sector, the relative importance of employees, technicians, managers, short term contracts and
women in the establishment. Finally, we also consider whether the establishment has already
implemented the reduction in the number of working hours (35 hours per week) approved by
the French government in the mid nineties. We deﬁne these variables as:
² Union: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the workers have a union representative
in the establishment. It seems quite intuitive that the presence of unions promotes job
stability inside the establishment as far as the union cares about employment and not only
about wages11.
² Variation: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the economic activity of the establishment
has known an unusual variation (positive or negative) in 1998.
11Here we do not refer to the eﬀect of unions on ICT adoption since results seem more ambiguous. Schnabel
and Wagner (1992), on the basis of a panel of German industries, ﬁnd no signiﬁcant association. Addison and
Wagner (1994), using British and German data, conclude the existence of a positive association between unions
and R&D in “low tech” industries. Allen (1988) working with U.S. industries ﬁnds a negative and signiﬁcant
association between the presence of unions and R&D intensity. Menezes-Filho, Ulph, and Van Reenen (1998)
conclude that the relationship between the union density and R&D is non-linear. R&D rises with union density
up to a threshold and then falls again (this pattern does not hold when unions bargain only over wages).
18² Tech. change: Dummy variable capturing whether the establishment has suﬀered an
important technological change over the last three years.
² The evolution of the economic activity of the establishment during the last three years is
captured through the variables: increasing, strongly increasing, decreasing and strongly
decreasing. While the eﬀect of a decreasing economic context on job turnover seems
quite clear since there are more job destructions and less job creations, the eﬀect of an
increasing context risks to be more ambiguous. On the one hand, we can expect less jobs
to be destroyed (smaller turnover) and more to be created, however, the number of quits
is also likely to increase (bigger turnover) because workers know that they have a higher
probability to ﬁnd another job.
² We control for the size of the establishment through two dummy variables capturing
whether the establishment has between 20 and 50 workers (Size 20-50) or more than
500 workers (Size +500).
² P. Employees, P. Technicians and P. Managers are the proportion of employees, technicians
and managers in the establishment.
² P. Women is the proportion of women in the establishment.
² P. Contract is the proportion of ﬁxed duration contracts in the establishment.
² Hours: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the ﬁrm has already implemented the reduc-
tion in the number of working hours to 35 hours per week.
² We control for 16 economic sectors: agriculture and ﬁshing; agricultural and food indus-
try; consumption industry; automobile industry; equipment industry; intermediary goods
industry; energy sector; building sector; trade sector; transport sector; ﬁnancial activity
sector; housing activities; services to ﬁrms; services to individuals; education, health and
social action; and the public administration.
193.5 Descriptive statistics
Table 24 in appendix C summarizes the means and standard deviations of all variables included
in our analysis. The category of workers presenting the relatively most important turnover is
the employees, followed by managers, intermediary professionals and manual workers. Even if
manual workers are those with the smallest labor ﬂows, they have also the smallest standard
deviation, which contrast with the high standard deviation of mangers or employees. Most of
these labor ﬂows correspond to women.
With regards to technological variables, notice the high presence of chain production systems
and the low degree of penetration of internet in the establishments. Concerning organizational
practices, the most commonly used ones are the reduction in the number of hierarchical levels,
the just in time production systems and the implementation of quality control procedures.
Table 25 in appendix C presents the correlation matrix between the labor ﬂows, technological
variables and organizational variables. The upward part of the table displays the pairwise
correlations between labor ﬂows and the technological and organizational variables of the model.
The downward part of the table presents the pairwise correlations between the technological and
organizational variables.
The ﬁrst part of the table reveals a positive correlation between the labor ﬂows of manual
workers, COMPUTER and NET. This contrast with the systematically negative correlation
observed for all professional categories’ labor ﬂows and CHAIN. Organizational practices such
as the rotation of workers among diﬀerent tasks, total quality control procedures or the reduction
of hierarchical levels are negatively correlated with the turnover of intermediary professionals,
employees and manual workers. Besides, AUTONOMOUS and PROJECT are positively related
to managers’ ﬂows.
From the second part of the table we remark that the use of new technologies and the introduction
of new organizational practices are most of the times positively correlated (complementary
relationship). However, the rotation of workers among tasks or the just in time production
systems are negatively related to COMPUTER and NET. A negative correlation between the
autonomous teams of production and COMPUTER is also observed.
204 Econometric strategy
Our structural model provides predictions on the eﬀects of biased shocks on the labor ﬂows of
diﬀerent occupations (no prediction can be drawn when considering all workers together). More
particularly, any technological or organizational change improving (deteriorating) the relative
productivity of a particular professional category should reduce (increase) its turnover. In this
sense, ICT adoption normally stimulates the turnover of production workers (simple jobs) while
many HPWO practices increase the turnover of managers (complex jobs). We proceed now to
test these results through the estimation of the following econometric model:
Yiet = ®1 Iiet + ®2 Oiet + ®3 Xiet + Àiet ; (19)
where the dependent variables are the labor ﬂows of managers, intermediary professions, em-
ployees, manual workers, all workers, women workers and men workers. The vector Iiet contains
all variables measuring the presence of information and communication technologies in the es-
tablishment. These variables are COMPUTER, NET, INTERNET and CHAIN. We expect
®1 > 0 for intermediary professions, employees and manual workers, and ®1 < 0 for managers.
The vector Oiet includes all variables describing the introduction of HPWO practices by the
establishment. It contains: AUTONOMOUS, PROJECT, ROTATION, QUALITY, HIERAR-
CHY and J.I.T.. In this case, we expect ®2 > 0 for managers and ®2 < 0 for the rest of the
occupations. Finally Xit is the vector of controls, where we introduce other variables that could
aﬀect the labor ﬂows, such as the presence of unions, the evolution of the economic activity
of the establishment, its size, the number of hours worked in the establishment, the sector of
activity and the proportion of employees, technicians, managers, women and workers with ﬁxed
duration contract in the establishment.
Our econometric analysis follows the standard stages for studying the establishments’ labor
ﬂows:
² We ﬁrst estimate equation (19) using OLS. For each professional category we estimate
three econometric models displayed in appendix A: one including all control variables,
model 1; a second one eliminating the variables that are systematically non signiﬁcant for
all professional categories, model 2; and a third model eliminating the least signiﬁcant
21variables for the particular professional category under consideration, model 3. For the
body of the paper we keep model 2.
² Second, the high degree of intercorrelation among the explicative variables (see table 25)
may yield biased coeﬃcients in our estimations. To solve this problem, a traditional
approach used in the literature (see Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997)) when only
cross-sectional data is available, consists in deﬁning sets of highly correlated practices
(“clusters”) and re-estimate equation (19) introducing them as explicative variables .
² In a third stage, after implementing a brief descriptive study of the labor ﬂows of each
professional category, we proceed to analyze whether the decisions to have or not labor
ﬂows and the quantity of these ﬂows, are independent decisions. To do so we use the
Heckman two steps model, according to which, in the relationship:
FLOWSet = ®1 Iet + ®2 Oet + ®3 Xet + Àet ; (20)
the dependent variable is not always observed. Its observability depends on a certain
number of characteristics. Therefore, the Heckman model estimates ﬁrst:
y¤
t = ¯ Zt + ut ; (21)
where y¤
t is the probability to observe labor ﬂows and Zt a vector containing technological
and organizational variables, as well as variables concerning the economic situation of the
ﬁrm, its size, its labor force composition and its economic sector. Notice that,
FLOWSt = 1 if y¤
t > 0 (22)
FLOWSt = 0 otherwise : (23)
On the basis of this result the relationship (20) is re-estimated. The Heckman selection
model estimates, thus, in ﬁrst place, a probit model (identiﬁcation model) where the de-
pendent variable is equal to unity if we observe labor ﬂows and zero in case we do not
observe them. This phase reveals the determinants of the decision to have or not workers’
turnover (equation (21)). In a second step, the Heckman method, considers only estab-
lishments having non null ﬂows and estimates the determinants of the quantity of these
22ﬂows (equation (20)). When corr(Àt;ut) = ½ > 0, that is, when the decisions concern-
ing the presence or absence of labor ﬂows and the amount of labor ﬂows, are correlated,
the Heckman selection model provides consistent, asymptotically eﬃcient estimates for all
parameters.
The variables included in the identiﬁcation model (the vector Zt) are chosen according to
the following procedure:
1. First, we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable captures the presence
of labor ﬂows. We include in this model all the explicative and control variables
deﬁned in sections 3.2 to 3.4.
2. Second, we compare whether some control variables that were non signiﬁcant in the
OLS estimation of model 1 (ﬁrst column in tables 12-18), become now signiﬁcant in
the probit model. These variables are the identiﬁcation variables, that is, they aﬀect
the decision of the establishments to have or not labor ﬂows but they do not aﬀect
the amount of the ﬂows.
3. The vector Zt contains ﬁnally the following variables: COMPUTER, NET, INTER-
NET, CHAIN, AUTONOMOUS, PROJECT, ROTATION, QUALITY, HIERAR-
CHY, J.I.T., Union, Variation, Tech. change, Strongly increasing, Increasing, De-
creasing, Strongly decreasing, Size 20-50, Size +500, Hours, P. Employees, P. Tech-
nicians, P. Managers, P. Women, P. Contract and 16 economic sectors. Because
the explicative and control variables included in the estimation of equation (20) cor-
respond to our model 2, the identiﬁcation variables are the following: Union, Tech.
change, Increasing, Strongly decreasing, Size 20-50, Size +500 as well as the following
sectors: Agriculture, Food industry, Consumption industry, Car industry, Equipment
industry and Intermediary industry.
As a ﬁnal remark, notice that there must be some other technological and organizational prac-
tices that aﬀect labor ﬂows and that we are unable to capture due to data limitations. This bias
is reﬂected on the low values of the adjusted R2.
235 Results
5.1 First estimations
Final estimates from the regressions are reported in appendix B, tables 12-18. For each pro-
fessional category models 1, 2 and 3 are estimated. Table 3 summarizes model 2 estimated
coeﬃcients for all categories. Again, because we work with cross-section data, we only provide
correlations that suggest same impacts. They reveal that the potential eﬀects of technological
and organizational variables diﬀer, and are even contradictory, depending on the professional
category under analysis. The ﬁndings are globally consistent with the theoretical predictions.
We comment with more detail the obtained results:
² The managers’ turnover seems positively inﬂuenced by the organizational practices target-
ing to improve the production workers empowerment and commitment to the ﬁrm, such
as the autonomous teams of production or project groups. On the contrary, the imple-
mentation of total quality control procedures is negatively correlated to the labor ﬂows
of managers; an interpretation of this ﬁnding is that quality control procedures require
qualiﬁed staﬀ to be developed more than they improve blue collar’s productivity (see sec-
tion 2.4). Regarding the contribution of each of these practices, table 4 shows that small
changes in any of them lead to important eﬀects on the observed labor ﬂows.
² In the intermediary professionals case, the only practice being signiﬁcant is the reduction
in the number of hierarchical levels, which is negatively correlated to their turnover. More-
over, the coeﬃcient associated to this practice is not even very important (an increase by
one unit in HIERARCHY “reduces” the intermediary professionals’ labor ﬂows by 0.28
units, see table 4).
² The massive use of computers in the establishment is positively related to higher job
instability of employees. In contrast, the organizational practice consisting in removing
managerial levels is positively associated with the relative productivity, motivation, com-
mitment and empowerment of employees and, therefore, it is negatively correlated to their
turnover. When comparing the importance of both correlations on the employees’ labor
24Table 3: Determinants of labor ﬂows for diﬀerent professional categories. French establishments
1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
MANAGERS INT.PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
COMPUTER 0 0 ++ 0 ++ 0 0
NET 0 0 0 ++ 0 0 0
CHAIN 0 0 0 - - 0 0 0
AUTONOMOUS + 0 0 0 0 0 0
PROJECT ++ 0 0 - 0 0 0
ROTATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
QUALITY - - 0 0 0 0 0 0
HIERARCHY 0 - - - 0 0 0 0
J.I.T. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Constant 0 0 ++ 0 ++ +++ 0
Observations 1390 1376 1361 1080 1335 1384 1389
Adj R2 0.043 0.146 0.072 0.085 0.130 0.065 0.124
Lecture: 0 Non signiﬁcant. + Positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10%.++ Positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5%.+++ Positive
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1%. - Negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10%. - - Negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5%. - - - Negative
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
25ﬂows (table 4) we observe that the impact of ICT is more than twice bigger than that of
HIERARCHY.
² Labor ﬂows of manual workers seem positively inﬂuenced by new technologies. More pre-
cisely, NET may have a large impact on their turnover (66%). On the opposite, because
more traditional chain production systems and project groups improve the relative pro-
ductivity of manual workers, they are also negatively related to their labor ﬂows.
² The theoretical setup developed in this paper does not provide any prediction when all
professional categories are considered together, that is, for TOTAL, WOMEN and MEN.
Results in tables 3 and 4 reveal a positive correlation between the massive use of computers
and aggregate labor ﬂows (TOTAL). Furthermore, an increase in COMPUTER by 1 unit
yields an increase in total labor ﬂows by 0.31 units. When considering separately women
or men no signiﬁcant correlation arises.
To summarize, empirical estimates suggest that, since ICT are skill-requiring, their adoption
positively inﬂuences turnover of employees and manual workers, who do not have these skills.
Probably because these two categories of workers are the most numerous ones, we also observe
that aggregate labor ﬂows are positively correlated to the massive use of computers. On the
other hand, the fact that most HPWO practices try to stimulate motivation, participation and
productivity of blue collar workers (production workers), explains their positive eﬀect on the
labor ﬂows of managers and their negative eﬀect on the turnover of intermediary professionals,
employees (impact of HIERARCHY) and manual workers (impact of PROJECT). Finally, since
ICT adoption is generally accompanied by changes in the internal organization of ﬁrms (HPWO
practices), we can guess an upturn in the labor ﬂows of all workers categories over the last
years, either through the ICT eﬀect for the blue collars, or through the HPWO practices for the
white collars. Moreover, the reduction in the use of chain production systems has reinforced job
instability of manual workers.
5.2 Dealing with the multicolinearity problem
The high degree of intercorrelation among the explicative variables (see table 25) indicates that
the empirical model estimating the impact of ICT and HPWO practices on the labor ﬂows may
26Table 4: Contribution of each technological and organizational practice to the observed labor
ﬂows of each professional category. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
MANAGERS INT. PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
OBSERVED
FLOWS 0.741 0.764 0.697 0.921 0.574 1.081 0.845
Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. %
COMPUTER -1.277 ns 0.242 ns 0.796 86.38% 0.074 ns 0.228 30.76% 0.274 ns 0.315 ns
NET -0.277 ns -0.006 ns -0.051 ns 0.378 65.83% -0.107 ns -0.120 ns -0.196 ns
CHAIN -0.524 ns 0.061 ns -0.186 ns -0.264 -45.97% -0.053 ns -0.205 ns -0.102 ns
AUTONOMOUS 2.616 342.40% 0.145 ns -0.124 ns -0.045 ns 0.055 ns -0.041 ns 0.219 ns
PROJECT 3.037 397.56% -0.278 ns -0.197 ns -0.296 -51.52% -0.055 ns -0.154 ns -0.090 ns
ROTATION -1.562 ns 0.185 ns 0.411 ns -0.134 ns 0.123 ns 0.232 ns 0.173 ns
QUALITY -2.691 -352.17% 0.175 ns -0.025 ns -0.084 ns -0.080 ns -0.195 ns 0.195 ns
HIERARCHY 0.974 ns -0.194 -27.80% -0.360 -39.04% 0.024 ns -0.058 ns -0.019 ns -0.069 ns
J.I.T. 1.119 ns -0.039 ns -0.026 ns 0.073 ns 0.028 ns 0.039 ns 0.021 ns
Observations 1390 1376 1361 1080 1335 1384 1389
Adj R2 0.043 0.146 0.072 0.085 0.130 0.065 0.124
Coef.: Estimated coeﬃcient in the OLS regression
%: Percentage of the observed labor ﬂows explained by the corresponding coeﬃcient.
ns: not signiﬁcant.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
27yield biased coeﬃcients. To solve this problem a traditional approach used in the literature (e.g.,
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997)) when only cross-sectional data is available, consists
in deﬁning sets of highly correlated practices. We consider in this paper two types of clusters
diﬀering in their economic interpretation:
² We analyze ﬁrst the impact of what we will call “incremental organization” or “additive
clusters”. These sets of practices capture a kind of continuity in the technological and
organizational changes.
² Second, we consider the eﬀect of clusters including complementary technological and or-
ganizational practices (“multiplicative clusters”). There is an increasing literature (e.g.,
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) or Askenazy and Gianella (2000)) claiming that
ﬁrms realize the largest gains in productivity by adopting clusters of complementary prac-
tices. It seems, thus, relevant to analyze the eﬀect that these sets of interactive practices
have on the labor ﬂows.
5.2.1 The incremental organization
The incremental organization can be economically interpreted as measuring a continuity in
the process of introduction of technological and organizational changes. We deﬁne ﬁve sets of
variables capturing practices having a similar objective and being highly intercorrelated:
1. TECHNOLOGY: Cluster including the technological variables COMPUTER and NET.
The presence of one of these practices is suﬃcient to guarantee the non nullity of TECH-
NOLOGY.
2. CHAIN: Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the establishment still uses tayloristic
production systems (robots, computer assisted systems, etc.).
3. TEAMWORK: Set of organizational variables including all practices tending towards
the delegation of responsibilities and the promotion of working teams. The non nullity
of TEAMWORK is guaranteed by the presence of any of the following practices: AU-
TONOMOUS, PROJECT or HIERARCHY.
284. FLEXIBILITY: Cluster covering all organizational practices stimulating a ﬂexible job as-
signment (ROTATION and J.I.T.).
5. QUALITY: Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the establishment develops a total
quality control procedure.
Table 5: Eﬀects of incremental organization on the labor ﬂows of diﬀerent professional categories.
French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
MANAGERS INT.PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
TECHNOLOGY 0 0 + ++ 0 0 0
CHAIN 0 0 0 - - 0 0 0
TEAMWORK +++ - - - 0 0 0 0
FLEXIBILITY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
QUALITY - 0 0 0 0 0 0
Constant 0 0 ++ 0 ++ +++ 0
Observations 1390 1376 1361 1080 1335 1384 1389
Adj R2 0.043 0.146 0.072 0.084 0.129 0.066 0.122
Lecture: 0 Non signiﬁcant. + Positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10%.++ Positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5%.+++ Positive
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1%. - Negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10%. - - Negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5%. - - - Negative
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
Tables 5 and 6 summarize estimations in table 19 (appendix B), and they mainly conﬁrm the
results displayed in tables 3 and 4:
² Workplace organizational practices favoring the delegation of responsibilities to lower hi-
erarchical levels as well as the presence of working teams (TEAMWORK) are positively
related to the increased turnover observed for the managers. In contrast, quality control
procedures continue to have a stabilization eﬀect on their turnover. The latter eﬀect is
stronger than the former (see table 6).
² The set of organizational practices included in TEAMWORK is negatively correlated to
the intermediary professionals’ turnover. Their eﬀect remains, though, quite small (an
29increase of one unit in TEAMWORK reduces intermediary professionals’ labor ﬂows by
0.20 units).
² Regarding employees, ICT and HPWO practices act in opposite sense. While TECHNOL-
OGY is positively associated with their turnover, TEAMWORK is negatively correlated
to the employees’ ﬂows. Furthermore, the size of their contribution is quite close (see table
6).
² In the manual workers’ case new technologies continue to have a positive inﬂuence on labor
ﬂows while tayloristic production systems negatively aﬀect them, the importance of both
eﬀects being similar.
² Finally, when considering all workers, women workers and men workers, no practice ap-
pears as signiﬁcant.
Table 6: Contribution of the incremental organization practices to the observed labor ﬂows of
each professional category. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
MANAGERS INT. PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
OBSERVED
FLOWS 0.741 0.764 0.697 0.921 0.574 1.081 0.845
Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. %
TECHNOLOGY -0.687 ns 0.097 ns 0.337 36.55% 0.227 39.63% 0.046 ns 0.056 ns 0.032 ns
CHAIN -0.448 ns 0.054 ns -0.203 ns -0.251 -43.74% -0.055 ns -0.210 ns -0.106 ns
TEAMWORK 1.864 243.98% -0.143 -20.46% -0.278 -30.21% -0.063 ns -0.035 ns -0.060 ns -0.015 ns
FLEXIBILITY 0.466 ns 0.013 ns 0.072 ns 0.024 ns 0.048 ns 0.084 ns 0.054 ns
QUALITY -2.532 -331.47% 0.162 ns -0.052 ns -0.077 ns -0.087 ns -0.211 ns 0.181 ns
Observations 1390 1376 1361 1080 1335 1384 1389
Adj R2 0.043 0.146 0.072 0.084 0.129 0.066 0.122
Coef.: Estimated coeﬃcient in the OLS regression
%: Percentage of the observed labor ﬂows explained by the corresponding coeﬃcient.
ns: not signiﬁcant.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
30The two general conclusions drawn from the analysis of tables 3 and 4 continue to apply when
considering incremental organization. First, ICT adoption has been associated with a higher
turnover of employees and manual workers. In the last case, the progressive disappearance of
chain production systems has stimulated even more labor ﬂows. Second, HPWO practices con-
sisting in the reduction of hierarchical levels and the promotion of autonomous working groups
are positively correlated to the turnover of managers and negatively to that of intermediary
professionals and employees. In contrast, because quality control procedures require qualiﬁed
staﬀ, they promote stability in the manager’s ﬂows.
5.2.2 The complementary relationships
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) argue that the ﬁrms realize the largest gains in pro-
ductivity by adopting clusters of complementary practices (“multiplicative clusters”). It seems,
thus, relevant to analyze the eﬀect that these sets of complementary practices have on the labor
ﬂows. We consider two sets of variables12:
1. TEAMWORK*: Set of organizational variables including all practices tending towards
the delegation of responsibilities and the promotion of working teams. The non nul-
lity of TEAMWORK* is only guaranteed when the HPWO practices AUTONOMOUS,
PROJECT and HIERARCHY are simultaneously present in the establishment.
2. ICT FLEXIBILITY: This cluster combines technological and organizational variables. It
tries to capture the fact that the massive use of new technologies (COMPUTER) and the
introduction of ﬂexible job assignment practices (ROTATION), normally act in the same
sense over labor ﬂows.
Results in tables 7 and 8 reveal that labor ﬂows of TOTAL, WOMEN and MEN are positively
correlated to the simultaneous introduction of ICT and ﬂexible job assignment practices. The
complementary eﬀect of technological and organizational practices captured by the variable ICT
FLEXIBILITY is positively related to the upturn in aggregate turnover. Moreover, individual
technological and organizational variables are non signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the key role played by
12Alternative clusters of complementary variables have been considered, but they were non signiﬁcant.
31Table 7: Eﬀects of multiplicative clusters on the labor ﬂows of diﬀerent professional categories.
French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
MANAGERS INT.PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
COMPUTER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NET 0 0 0 ++ 0 0 0
CHAIN 0 0 0 - - 0 0 0
AUTONOMOUS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PROJECT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ROTATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
QUALITY - 0 0 0 0 0 0
HIERARCHY 0 - - - 0 0 0 0
J.I.T. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TEAMWORK* +++ 0 0 0 0 0 0
ICT FLEXIBILITY 0 0 +++ 0 +++ +++ ++
Observations 1390 1376 1361 1080 1335 1384 1389
Adj R2 0.049 0.145 0.080 0.084 0.137 0.066 0.126
Lecture: 0 Non signiﬁcant. + Positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10%.++ Positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5%.+++ Positive
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1%. - Negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10%. - - Negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5%. - - - Negative
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
32complementarities (see table 8 to get an idea on the importance of their impact). The detailed
analysis of the diﬀerent professional categories leads to the following results:
² Regarding managers, the individual variables AUTONOMOUS, PROJECT and HIER-
ARCHY loose their signiﬁcance, while the variable capturing their interactions (TEAM-
WORK*) becomes signiﬁcant and positive. The three HPWO practices reinforce, thus,
each other, and their interaction is positively related to more important labor ﬂows. The
quality control procedures continue to be negatively correlated to the managers’ turnover,
however, their eﬀect is much less strong than the one of TEAMWORK* (see table 8).
² Job stability of intermediary professionals is still uniquely aﬀected by the reduction in the
number of hierarchical levels and complementarities play no role.
Table 8: Contribution of the complementary practices (multiplicative clusters) to the observed
labor ﬂows of each professional category. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
MANAGERS INT. PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
OBSERVED
FLOWS 0.741 0.764 0.697 0.921 0.574 1.081 0.845
Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. % Coef. %
COMPUTER -1.16 ns 0.19 ns 0.24 ns 0.17 ns 0.06 ns 0.06 ns 0.12 ns
NET -0.47 ns -0.01 ns -0.06 ns 0.38 65.7% -0.11 ns -0.12 ns -0.20 ns
CHAIN -0.57 ns 0.06 ns -0.19 ns -0.27 -46.4% -0.05 ns -0.20 ns -0.10 ns
AUTONOMOUS -0.03 ns 0.11 ns -0.31 ns -0.07 ns -0.01 ns -0.04 ns 0.15 ns
PROJECT 0.70 ns -0.31 ns -0.37 ns -0.32 ns -0.12 ns -0.16 ns -0.15 ns
ROTATION -1.42 ns 0.14 ns -0.08 ns -0.07 ns -0.03 ns 0.04 ns 0.00 ns
QUALITY -2.50 -327.3% 0.18 ns -0.02 ns -0.08 ns -0.08 ns -0.20 ns 0.20 ns
HIERARCHY 0.51 ns -0.20 -28.9% -0.41 -44.7% 0.02 ns -0.08 ns -0.03 ns -0.09 ns
J.I.T. 0.97 ns -0.04 ns -0.05 ns 0.07 ns 0.02 ns 0.03 ns 0.01 ns
TEAMWORK* 5.85 766.3% 0.08 ns 0.39 ns 0.05 ns 0.16 ns 0.00 ns 0.15 ns
ICT FLEXIBILITY -0.18 ns 0.23 ns 2.36 256.2% -0.34 ns 0.68 91.8% 0.89 82.5% 0.80 94.6%
Observations 1390 1376 1361 1080 1335 1384 1389
Adj R2 0.049 0.145 0.080 0.084 0.137 0.066 0.126
Coef.: Estimated coeﬃcient in the OLS regression
%: Percentage of the observed labor ﬂows explained by the corresponding coeﬃcient.
ns: not signiﬁcant.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
33² Concerning employees, the combination of new technologies and ﬂexible organizational
practices (ICT FLEXIBILITY), is positively correlated to their turnover, its eﬀect being
very important, i.e. an upturn in ICT FLEXIBILITY by one unit is associated with an
increase in the employees labor ﬂows by 2.56 units. The HPWO practice consisting in
delegating responsibilities to lower hierarchical levels (HIERARCHY) seems to act in the
opposite sense, reducing job instability, but its eﬀect is almost six times smaller than the
one of ICT FLEXIBILITY.
² Finally, results regarding the manual workers’ turnover are not modiﬁed with respect to
table 3. The combined reduction in chain production systems and the increased use of new
technologies are positively correlated to the rise in labor ﬂows. In this case, the potential
complementarities among technological and organizational variables are not signiﬁcant.
To sum up, complementarities among HPWO practices (TEAMWORK*) or among technologi-
cal and organizational practices (ICT FLEXIBILITY) must also be considered when analyzing
labor ﬂows issues. More particularly, the combination of ICT and ﬂexible job assignment prac-
tices is positively correlated to the turnover of all workers, women workers, men workers and
employees. In contrast, the combination of HPWO practices (TEAMWORK*) has mainly af-
fected managers. In all cases, the impact of these complementarities on the labor ﬂows is more
important than the eﬀect of the individual variables.
5.3 Separating decisions
5.3.1 A descriptive analysis of the labor ﬂows
Table 9 shows that 31.5% of the establishments do not have managers’ labor ﬂows. This per-
centage reduces to 19% when considering intermediary professionals and employees. For manual
workers, women workers and men workers less than 10% of the establishments have zero la-
bor ﬂows. Finally, when we consider all professional categories together (TOTAL) there is no
establishment having zero turnover. These ﬁgures suggest that when dealing with managers, in-
termediary professions, employees and, potentially, manual workers, establishments must make
two decisions: one concerning whether to have or not labor ﬂows and, a second one, regard-
ing the amount of labor ﬂows. This idea is reinforced by ﬁgure 3, representing graphically the
34frequency distribution of the labor ﬂows per establishment for the four professional categories
under consideration.
Table 9: Percentage of establishments with zero labor ﬂows. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: percentage of establishments with 0 labor ﬂows for:
MANAGERS INT.PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
31.51% 18.95% 19.80% 9.94% 0.00% 5.00% 1.61%
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
The above description of the data reveals, therefore, that the econometric analysis must distin-
guish two diﬀerent phenomena, at least when dealing with managers, intermediary professions,
employees and manual workers: the ﬁrst phenomenon to be studied refers to the factors that
lead establishments to have labor ﬂows; and the second one, concerns the determinants of the
amount of ﬂows in the establishments that already present a non null turnover.
5.3.2 Heckman estimations
The best way to study the two mentioned decision problems is through a Heckman selection
method. As explained in section 4, this method estimates, ﬁrst, the determinants of the presence
of non null labor ﬂows through a probit model. Then, it estimates the determinants of the
amount of ﬂows in those establishments presenting positive turnover. Finally, the Heckman
method provides the correlation coeﬃcient (½) between the decision of having non zero labor
ﬂows and the amount of these ﬂows. If this coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (Prob>
Â2 is smaller than 0.10) both decisions are correlated and the Heckman method gives consistent,
asymptotically eﬃcient estimates for all parameters. If ½ is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
both decisions are independent and the results provided by the Heckman method are the same
as if we had directly implemented an OLS regression on the establishments presenting positive
ﬂows, since there is no selection bias.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lecture: The X-axe represents the amount of labor ﬂows of each professional category per intervals. The Y-axe corresponds
to the percentage of establishments presenting the indicated labor ﬂows.
Figure 3: Histograms of the labor ﬂows associated to each professional category.
36of non zero labor ﬂows. As a general comment we notice that the smaller (bigger) the size of
the establishment the less (more) likely is the presence of labor ﬂows. Moreover, the larger
the proportion of employees, managers and ﬁxed duration contracts in the establishment the
higher the probability of observing labor turnover. The use of tayloristic production systems
is positively related to the presence of labor ﬂows for managers, intermediary professionals and
employees.
Regarding in detail each professional category, we observe that the reduction in the number of
hierarchical levels inside the establishment as well as the presence of unions positively inﬂuences
the decision to have managers’ labor ﬂows. In what concerns intermediary professionals, while
a high degree of penetration of internet is positively related to the presence of turnover, an
increasing economic context negatively aﬀects it. NET increases the probability of having labor
ﬂows for employees and INTERNET decreases the probability of having labor ﬂows for manual
workers.
Estimations of equation (20), that is, once we are only considering establishments with non null
ﬂows, are summarized in table 11. Apart from INT.PROFES. where the correlation coeﬃcient
(½) is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, for the rest of the professional categories it can be claimed
that there is independence between the decision of having or not labor ﬂows and the decision
concerning the amount of labor ﬂows. For these professional categories, the estimations provided
in table 11 are thus equivalent as if we had directly implemented an OLS regression on the
establishments having non null labor ﬂows, since there is no selection bias.
When comparing the results in tables 3 and 11 we observe that the estimates are essentially
the same except from the intermediary professionals’ case where, once we correct for the selec-
tion bias, no technological or organizational variable is signiﬁcant. In the employees’ case we
also observe that the HPWO practice consisting in making the workers rotate among tasks is
positively correlated to the amount of labor ﬂows.
37Table 10: Determinants of the presence of labor ﬂows (probit model). French establishments
1998.
Dependent variable equals 1 when there are labor ﬂows
MANAGERS INT.PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS
ICT:
COMPUTER 0 0 0 0
NET 0 0 +++ 0
INTERNET 0 +++ 0 - - -
CHAIN +++ + ++ 0
HPWO:
AUTONOMOUS 0 0 0 ++
PROJECT 0 0 0 0
ROTATION 0 0 0 0
QUALITY 0 0 0 0
HIERARCHY +++ 0 0 0
J.I.T. 0 0 0 0
Controls:
Union ++ 0 0 0
Variation 0 0 0 0
Tech. change 0 0 0 0
Strongly increasing 0 0 0 0
Increasing 0 - - 0 0
Decreasing 0 + 0 0
Strongly decreasing 0 0 0 0
Size 20-50 - - - - - - - - - - -
Size +500 +++ +++ +++ 0
Hours 0 0 0 0
P. Employees +++ +++ +++ 0
P. Technicians ++ - - - ++ 0
P. Managers +++ +++ 0 0
P. Women 0 0 0 0
P. Contract 0 + ++ 0
Lecture: 0 Non signiﬁcant. + Positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10%.++ Positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5%.+++ Positive
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1%. - Negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10%. - - Negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5%. - - - Negative
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
38Table 11: Determinants of the amount of labor ﬂows for each professional category. French
establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: non null labor ﬂows for
MANAGERS INT.PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS
COMPUTER 0 0 ++ 0
NET 0 0 0 ++
CHAIN 0 0 0 -
AUTONOMOUS + 0 0 0
PROJECT + 0 0 - -
ROTATION 0 0 + 0
QUALITY - 0 0 0
HIERARCHY 0 0 - - 0
J.I.T. 0 0 0 0
Constant 0 - - - +++ 0
Statistics of the Heckman model
Observations 1388 1374 1359 1079
Censored Observations 418 235 245 90
Uncensored Observations 970 1139 1114 989
Wald Â2 107.310 243.040 143.720 130.540
Prob> Â2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
½ -0.019 1.000 -0.016 -0.048
(0.066) (0.000) (0.078) (0.069)
Â2(1) 0.070 657.880 0.040 0.380
Prob> Â2 0.794 0.000 0.851 0.537
Lecture: 0 Non signiﬁcant. + Positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10%.++ Positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5%.+++ Positive
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1%. - Negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10%. - - Negative coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5%. - - - Negative
coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1%.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
396 Conclusion
The main objective of this paper was to shed some light on one aspect for which the existent liter-
ature is not very abundant: the eﬀect of ICT and HPWO practices on job stability (labor ﬂows).
We ﬁrst develop a very simple theoretical setup inspired in Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002). The
comparative static analysis exercise facilitates the understanding of the economic mechanisms
underlying behind the empirical evidence: any technological or organizational change improving
the relative productivity of one type of job will tend to reduce its turnover and increase the
turnover of the other jobs.
We then develop an empirical analysis based on a French database and covering more than
twenty-ﬁve hundred establishments. Our estimations reveal that, when considering all profes-
sional categories together (all workers, women workers or men workers) the only signiﬁcant
correlation comes from the complementarities arising between ICT and ﬂexible job assignment
practices, the individual technological and organizational practices being non signiﬁcant.
The detailed analysis by professional categories shows that the adoption of innovative workplace
organizational practices (either progressively or simultaneously) has positively inﬂuenced the
managers’ turnover. In contrast, these practices are negatively correlated to the labor ﬂows of
intermediary professionals, employees and manual workers. This result is probably due to the
fact that HPWO practices tend to stimulate the productivity of blue collar workers.
Finally, ICT adoption is positively associated with a higher turnover of employees and manual
workers, whose relative productivity is likely to be deteriorated by the introduction of these new
technologies. Moreover, the progressive disappearance of the tayloristic production systems is
also positively correlated to the manual workers’ turnover.
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437 Appendix A: Steady state.
At the equilibrium the ﬁrms open vacancies until no more beneﬁt can be obtained, that is, all
rents are exhausted and the free entry condition applies: Πvc
= 0 and Πvs
= 0. From equations
(5), (6), (7) and (8) we derive the following expressions for each period:
ac




Max[Sc(x);0] dΦ(x) ; (24)
as




Max[Ss(x);0] dΦ(x) : (25)
All job contacts will not lead to a job creation since, once the contact is made and the idiosyn-
cratic productivity revealed, both parties may realize that the match is not productive enough
to compensate for the search and hiring eﬀorts. A contact will become a productive match if
and only if the joint surplus (the one obtained by the ﬁrm plus the one of the worker) is positive.
Therefore, for each type of job there exists a a critical productivity level, "c and "s, such that
Sc("c) = 0 and Ss("s) = 0. Below these reservation productivity levels the joint surplus is
negative and it is not proﬁtable to create or continue a job.
To compute "c and "s, we ﬁrst deﬁne the joint surplus of both types of jobs using equations
(5)-(14) as well as the free entry conditions, (24) and (25):














At the threshold values "c and "s, equations (26) and (27) respectively become zero leading to:
´ ac #c
1 ¡ ´
= "c + h1 ¡ wu + ¯ ¸
Z "
"c
Sc(x) dΦ(x) ; (28)
´ as #s
1 ¡ ´
= "s + h2 ¡ wu + ¯ ¸
Z "
"s
Ss(x) dΦ(x) : (29)
From (26) and (27) we know that S0 c = 1
1¡¯(1¡¸) > 0 and S0 s = 1
1¡¯(1¡¸) > 0, for " ¸ "c and
" ¸ "s, respectively. Using these results and integrating by parts the integrals in (28) and (29)
permits to determine the complex and simple job destruction rules:
´ ac #c
1 ¡ ´
= "c + h1 ¡ wu +
¯ ¸
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
Z "
"c
(1 ¡ Φ(x)) dx ; (30)
´ as #s
1 ¡ ´
= "s + h2 ¡ wu +
¯ ¸
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
Z "
"s
(1 ¡ Φ(x)) dx : (31)
44Whether we consider the complex or the simple segment of the labor market we observe a positive
relationship between the market tightness of the corresponding segment and its reservation
productivity (see proof below). Therefore, the job destruction curves of the complex and simple
segment of the labor market are positively sloped in the space (#c;") and (#s;"), respectively.
Proof.
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(1 ¡ Φ("c)) :











We proceed then to determine the sign of the right hand side of equation (33). Because 0 < ¯ < 1
we know that 1 ¡ ¯ + ¯ ¸ > ¯ ¸. Therefore:
0 <
¯ ¸
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
< 1 :
At the same time, since Φ(x) is a probability distribution function we have that 0 · 1¡Φ("c) · 1.




1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
(1 ¡ Φ("c)) > 0 which implies
d#c
d"c > 0 : (34)
The job destruction curve in the complex segment is positive sloped. The positivity of the slope
in the simple segment can be determined in a similar way. ¥
45We apply on equations (24) and (25) the same procedure developed to compute (30) and (31)
in order to determine the job creation rule of each type of job:
ac
¯(1 ¡ ´) q(#c)
=
1
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
Z "
"c
(1 ¡ Φ(x)) dx ; (35)
as
¯(1 ¡ ´) q(#s)
=
1
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
Z "
"s
(1 ¡ Φ(x)) dx ; : (36)
We prove now that both equations determine a negative relationship between the market tight-
ness and ", meaning that the job creation curves are negatively sloped in the space (#i;") for
i = c;s.
Proof.















(1 ¡ Φ(x))dx ; (37)
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1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
(1 ¡ Φ("c)) :
Because 0 < ¯ < 1, 0 < ´ < 1 and ac > 0 the ﬁrst term on the left hand side, ac
¯ (1¡´), is positive.
At the same time, since 0 < ¸ < 1 and Φ(x) is a probability distribution function, the right







As q2(#c) is always positive and the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy is a decreasing function
on the labor market tightness (q0(#c) < 0), we ﬁnd that
q2(#c)
q0(#c) < 0. The job creation curve is
negatively sloped. ¥
Finally, substituting the value functions into the surplus sharing rules (5) and (6) we obtain the
following expression for the wages (see Pissarides (2000) chapter 2):
wc(") = (1 ¡ ´) wu + ´(" + h1 + ac#c) ; (39)
ws(") = (1 ¡ ´) wu + ´(" + h2 + as#s): (40)
468 Appendix B: Econometric results
OLS estimations
Table 12: Determinants of managers’ labor ﬂows. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
MANAGERS: model 1 MANAGERS: model 2 MANAGERS: model 3
COMPUTER -1.096 -1.277 -1.397
(1.736) (1.709) (1.488)




CHAIN -0.570 -0.524 -0.565
(0.945) (0.922) (0.756)
AUTONOMOUS 2.697 2.616 2.489
(1.485)* (1.466)* (1.347)*
PROJECT 3.115 3.037 2.635
(1.481)** (1.460)** (1.326)**
ROTATION -1.508 -1.562 -1.455
(1.380) (1.363) (1.246)
QUALITY -2.849 -2.691 -2.360
(1.364)** (1.347)** (1.204)**
HIERARCHY 0.960 0.974 0.743
(0.875) (0.862) (0.783)




















Hours 4.282 4.360 4.226
(1.768)** (1.748)*** (1.615)***
P. Employees 4.818 4.817 4.453
(2.987) (2.952)* (2.382)*
P. Technicians -0.617 -0.528
(4.514) (4.469)
P. Managers -3.272 -3.292 -1.939
(5.472) (5.216) (4.474)
P. Women 0.808 0.418
(2.922) (2.731)
P. Contract -6.606 -6.542 -4.308
(5.642) (5.575) (5.119)
Sectors (16) (10) (3)
Constant -1.656 -1.573 -1.277
(8.506) (2.459) (1.684)
Observations 1388 1390 1511
Adj R2 0.037 0.043 0.046
For Sectors we write in parentheses the number of economic sectors included in the regression.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.**Signiﬁcant at 5%.***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
47Table 13: Determinants of the intermediary professionals’ labor ﬂows. French establishments
1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
INT.PROFES.: model 1 INT.PROFES.: model 2 INT.PROFES.: model 3
COMPUTER 0.259 0.242 0.237
(0.231) (0.228) (0.224)




CHAIN 0.086 0.061 0.063
(0.126) (0.123) (0.110)
AUTONOMOUS 0.103 0.145 0.153
(0.197) (0.195) (0.193)
PROJECT -0.283 -0.278 -0.278
(0.197) (0.194) (0.193)
ROTATION 0.170 0.185 0.190
(0.184) (0.182) (0.180)
QUALITY 0.182 0.175 0.178
(0.181) (0.179) (0.177)
HIERARCHY -0.182 -0.194 -0.196
(0.117) (0.115)* (0.114)*




















Hours 0.286 0.258 0.262
(0.234) (0.232) (0.230)
P. Employees 0.708 0.733 0.669
(0.397)* (0.393)* (0.341)**
P. Technicians -3.237 -3.199 -3.216
(0.602)*** (0.597)*** (0.582)***
P. Managers 3.420 3.230 3.237
(0.726)*** (0.693)*** (0.683)***
P. Women 0.403 0.334 0.304
(0.388) (0.363) (0.343)
P. Contract 0.787 0.745 0.733
(0.748) (0.740) (0.735)
Sectors (16) (10) (4)
Constant 0.130 0.084 0.101
(0.842) (0.330) (0.285)
Observations 1374 1376 1376
Adj R2 0.143 0.146 0.150
For Sectors we write in parentheses the number of economic sectors included in the regression.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.**Signiﬁcant at 5%.***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
48Table 14: Determinants of the employees’ labor ﬂows. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
EMPLOYEES: model 1 EMPLOYEES: model 2 EMPLOYEES: model 3
COMPUTER 0.794 0.796 0.729
(0.369)** (0.364)** (0.335)**




CHAIN -0.193 -0.186 -0.189
(0.201) (0.196) (0.185)
AUTONOMOUS -0.153 -0.124 -0.122
(0.317) (0.314) (0.305)
PROJECT -0.189 -0.197 -0.191
(0.316) (0.312) (0.302)
ROTATION 0.427 0.411 0.399
(0.295) (0.291) (0.281)
QUALITY -0.052 -0.025 -0.020
(0.289) (0.286) (0.277)
HIERARCHY -0.329 -0.360 -0.323
(0.187)* (0.184)** (0.178)*




















Hours -0.190 -0.190 -0.196
(0.377) (0.373) (0.363)
P. Employees -3.839 -3.820 -3.785
(0.633)*** (0.627)*** (0.594)***
P. Technicians -2.334 -2.326 -2.116
(0.983)** (0.974)** (0.939)**
P. Managers -0.167 -0.223
(1.172) (1.124)
P. Women 1.712 1.519 1.450
(0.622)*** (0.581)*** (0.543)***
P. Contract 2.789 2.936 2.929
(1.200)** (1.187)*** (1.143)***
Sectors (16) (10) (7)
Constant 0.737 1.169 1.146
(1.794) (0.523)** (0.452)***
Observations 1359 1361 1403
Adj R2 0.069 0.072 0.078
For Sectors we write in parentheses the number of economic sectors included in the regression.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.**Signiﬁcant at 5%.***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
49Table 15: Determinants of the manual workers’ labor ﬂows. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
WORKERS: model 1 WORKERS: model 2 WORKERS: model 3
COMPUTER 0.116 0.074 0.093
(0.214) (0.212) (0.195)




CHAIN -0.206 -0.264 -0.254
(0.114)* (0.111)** (0.096)***
AUTONOMOUS -0.047 -0.045 -0.041
(0.171) (0.170) (0.162)
PROJECT -0.252 -0.296 -0.271
(0.179) (0.177)* (0.169)
ROTATION -0.148 -0.134 -0.120
(0.159) (0.157) (0.150)
QUALITY -0.062 -0.084 -0.080
(0.171) (0.170) (0.161)
HIERARCHY 0.065 0.024 0.017
(0.105) (0.104) (0.098)






















P. Employees 2.934 2.865 2.705
(0.498)*** (0.495)*** (0.471)***
P. Technicians 1.126 0.968 0.801
(0.619)* (0.612) (0.579)
P. Managers 0.626 0.161
(0.825) (0.796)
P. Women 0.676 0.578 0.532
(0.361)* (0.337)* (0.308)*
P. Contract 1.181 1.068 0.981
(0.686)* (0.679) (0.635)
Sectors (16) (10) (8)
Constant -1.175 0.133 0.170
(1.350) (0.296) (0.237)
Observations 1079 1080 1128
Adj R2 0.088 0.085 0.083
For Sectors we write in parentheses the number of economic sectors included in the regression.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.**Signiﬁcant at 5%.***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
50Table 16: Determinants of total labor ﬂows. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
TOTAL: model 1 TOTAL: model 2 TOTAL: model 3
COMPUTER 0.239 0.228 0.240
(0.113)** (0.112)** (0.101)**




CHAIN -0.011 -0.053 -0.046
(0.063) (0.062) (0.057)
AUTONOMOUS 0.051 0.055 0.035
(0.099) (0.098) (0.095)
PROJECT -0.036 -0.055 -0.040
(0.098) (0.097) (0.094)
ROTATION 0.094 0.123 0.103
(0.092) (0.091) (0.087)
QUALITY -0.063 -0.080 -0.049
(0.090) (0.089) (0.086)
HIERARCHY -0.047 -0.058 -0.050
(0.058) (0.057) (0.055)
















Size 20-50 0.270 0.167
(0.139)** (0.129)




P. Employees 0.535 0.557 0.621
(0.201)*** (0.199)*** (0.165)***
P. Technicians -0.574 -0.552 -0.465
(0.296)** (0.295)* (0.281)*
P. Managers 0.147 0.128
(0.369) (0.352)
P. Women 0.255 0.211 0.277
(0.196) (0.185) (0.169)*
P. Contract 0.455 0.375 0.424
(0.410) (0.406) (0.374)
Sectors (16) (10) (5)
Constant 1.906 0.351 0.353
(0.649)*** (0.164)** (0.145)***
Observations 1333 1335 1392
Adj R2 0.132 0.130 0.141
For Sectors we write in parentheses the number of economic sectors included in the regression.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.**Signiﬁcant at 5%.***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
51Table 17: Determinants of women’s labor ﬂows. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
WOMEN: model 1 WOMEN: model 2 WOMEN: model 3
COMPUTER 0.255 0.274 0.276
(0.248) (0.246) (0.228)




CHAIN -0.133 -0.205 -0.213
(0.136) (0.133) (0.129)*
AUTONOMOUS -0.048 -0.041 -0.041
(0.213) (0.211) (0.208)
PROJECT -0.140 -0.154 -0.148
(0.212) (0.210) (0.205)
ROTATION 0.210 0.232 0.190
(0.198) (0.196) (0.191)
QUALITY -0.177 -0.195 -0.182
(0.195) (0.194) (0.189)
HIERARCHY -0.023 -0.019 -0.021
(0.125) (0.124) (0.122)




















Hours -0.211 -0.180 -0.180
(0.253) (0.251) (0.248)
P. Employees 1.505 1.456 1.408
(0.428)*** (0.424)*** (0.405)***
P. Technicians -1.032 -1.033 -0.996
(0.647) (0.644) (0.633)
P. Managers -0.011 -0.015
(0.783) (0.750)
P. Women -2.724 -2.475 -2.384
(0.419)*** (0.393)*** (0.381)***
P. Contract 1.242 1.259 1.330
(0.810) (0.804) (0.788)*
Sectors (16) (10) (8)
Constant 2.038 1.685 1.673
(1.217)* (0.355)*** (0.334)***
Observations 1382 1384 1407
Adj R2 0.066 0.065 0.066
For Sectors we write in parentheses the number of economic sectors included in the regression.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.**Signiﬁcant at 5%.***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
52Table 18: Determinants of men’s labor ﬂows. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
MEN: model 1 MEN: model 2 MEN: model 3
COMPUTER 0.348 0.315 0.289
(0.199)* (0.196) (0.192)




CHAIN -0.067 -0.102 -0.131
(0.108) (0.105) (0.109)
AUTONOMOUS 0.197 0.219 0.203
(0.170) (0.168) (0.175)
PROJECT -0.068 -0.090 -0.094
(0.170) (0.168) (0.172)
ROTATION 0.147 0.173 0.157
(0.158) (0.156) (0.161)
QUALITY 0.206 0.195 0.280
(0.156) (0.155) (0.159)*
HIERARCHY -0.042 -0.069 -0.116
(0.100) (0.099) (0.102)




















Hours -0.064 -0.085 -0.116
(0.202) (0.200) (0.208)
P. Employees 0.226 0.248 0.411
(0.342) (0.339) (0.341)
P. Technicians -0.806 -0.799 -0.698
(0.517) (0.513) (0.529)
P. Managers 0.315 0.113
(0.627) (0.598)
P. Women 2.002 1.865
(0.335)*** (0.313)***
P. Contract -0.130 -0.186 2.096
(0.646) (0.640) (0.318)***
Sectors (16) (10) (10)
Constant 0.134 -0.250 -0.330
(0.728) (0.282) (0.282)
Observations 1387 1389 1428
Adj R2 0.121 0.124 0.123
For Sectors we write in parentheses the number of economic sectors included in the regression.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.**Signiﬁcant at 5%.***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
53OLS estimations with incremental organization
Table 19: Eﬀect of incremental organization (additive clusters) on the labor ﬂows of diﬀerent
professional categories. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
MANAGERS INT.PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
TECHNOLOGY -0.687 0.097 0.337 0.227 0.046 0.056 0.032
(0.951) (0.126) (0.203)* (0.119)** (0.063) (0.136) (0.109)
CHAIN -0.448 0.054 -0.203 -0.251 -0.055 -0.210 -0.106
(0.920) (0.123) (0.196) (0.111)** (0.062) (0.132) (0.106)
TEAMWORK 1.864 -0.143 -0.278 -0.063 -0.035 -0.060 -0.015
(0.600)*** (0.080)* (0.128)** (0.072) (0.040) (0.086) (0.069)
FLEXIBILITY 0.466 0.013 0.072 0.024 0.048 0.084 0.054
(0.616) (0.082) (0.132) (0.072) (0.041) (0.089) (0.071)
QUALITY -2.532 0.162 -0.052 -0.077 -0.087 -0.211 0.181
(1.345)* (0.179) (0.286) (0.170) (0.089) (0.193) (0.154)
Variation 0.866 0.133 0.091 -0.008 0.126 -0.089 0.170
(1.210) (0.161) (0.258) (0.146) (0.081) (0.174) (0.139)
Strongly increasing -0.329 -0.224 -0.054 -0.168 -0.179 -0.289 -0.136
(1.767) (0.236) (0.380) (0.220) (0.119) (0.254) (0.203)
Decreasing 5.140 0.427 -0.040 -0.213 0.104 -0.059 0.520
(1.842)*** (0.245)* (0.394) (0.216) (0.122) (0.264) (0.211)***
Hours 4.096 0.241 -0.207 -0.037 -0.026 -0.168 -0.102
(1.740)** (0.231) (0.372) (0.203) (0.115) (0.250) (0.200)
P. Employees 4.808 0.730 -3.766 2.813 0.573 1.478 0.273
(2.944)* (0.391)* (0.625)*** (0.494)*** (0.199)*** (0.423)*** (0.338)
P. Technicians -0.716 -3.171 -2.132 0.828 -0.497 -0.965 -0.712
(4.431) (0.592)*** (0.967)** (0.607) (0.293)* (0.638) (0.509)
P. Managers -2.611 3.075 -0.168 0.089 0.142 -0.018 0.081
(5.100) (0.677)*** (1.100) (0.786) (0.345) (0.732) (0.585)
P. Women 0.282 0.342 1.545 0.562 0.221 -2.458 1.879
(2.730) (0.363) (0.581)*** (0.337)* (0.185) (0.393)*** (0.313)***
P. Contract -6.357 0.772 3.014 1.041 0.401 1.263 -0.146
(5.570) (0.739) (1.186)*** (0.678) (0.406) (0.803) (0.639)
Sectors (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10)
Constant -2.318 0.110 1.149 0.193 0.339 1.718 -0.259
(2.417) (0.324) (0.514)** (0.289) (0.162)** (0.348)*** (0.277)
Observations 1390 1376 1361 1080 1335 1384 1389
Adj R2 0.043 0.146 0.072 0.084 0.129 0.066 0.122
For Sectors we write in parentheses the number of economic sectors included in the regression.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.**Signiﬁcant at 5%.***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
54OLS estimations with multiplicative clusters
Table 20: Eﬀect of multiplicative clusters on the labor ﬂows of diﬀerent professional categories.
French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: labor ﬂows for
MANAGERS INT.PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
COMPUTER -1.163 0.187 0.236 0.168 0.064 0.056 0.122
(1.869) (0.250) (0.397) (0.238) (0.123) (0.269) (0.215)
NET -0.473 -0.008 -0.055 0.377 -0.114 -0.115 -0.198
(1.529) (0.205) (0.327) (0.188)** (0.102) (0.220) (0.176)
CHAIN -0.572 0.061 -0.187 -0.266 -0.055 -0.204 -0.101
(0.919) (0.123) (0.195) (0.111)** (0.061) (0.133) (0.106)
AUTONOMOUS -0.028 0.110 -0.306 -0.066 -0.013 -0.041 0.150
(1.668) (0.223) (0.357) (0.191) (0.111) (0.241) (0.192)
PROJECT 0.702 -0.311 -0.373 -0.322 -0.122 -0.158 -0.155
(1.620) (0.216) (0.346) (0.202) (0.107) (0.233) (0.186)
ROTATION -1.417 0.136 -0.083 -0.072 -0.029 0.038 0.002
(1.522) (0.204) (0.324) (0.173) (0.102) (0.219) (0.175)
QUALITY -2.501 0.177 -0.018 -0.078 -0.076 -0.198 0.197
(1.344)* (0.180) (0.285) (0.170) (0.089) (0.194) (0.155)
HIERARCHY 0.513 -0.202 -0.411 0.023 -0.076 -0.026 -0.087
(0.871) (0.117)* (0.186)** (0.105) (0.058) (0.126) (0.100)
J.I.T. 0.972 -0.043 -0.052 0.074 0.020 0.032 0.011
(0.730) (0.097) (0.155) (0.087) (0.048) (0.105) (0.084)
TEAMWORK* 5.855 0.079 0.392 0.051 0.156 0.001 0.154
(1.781)*** (0.237) (0.380) (0.212) (0.117) (0.257) (0.205)
ICT FLEXIBILITY -0.180 0.231 2.360 -0.341 0.680 0.892 0.799
(3.149) (0.421) (0.679)*** (0.395) (0.206)*** (0.453)** (0.362)**
Variation 0.835 0.133 0.112 -0.013 0.124 -0.089 0.171
(1.210) (0.162) (0.258) (0.147) (0.081) (0.175) (0.139)
Strongly increasing -0.536 -0.233 -0.035 -0.186 -0.172 -0.277 -0.139
(1.763) (0.236) (0.379) (0.220) (0.118) (0.254) (0.203)
Decreasing 5.084 0.439 -0.046 -0.237 0.098 -0.062 0.523
(1.838)*** (0.246)* (0.392) (0.216) (0.122) (0.265) (0.211)***
Hours 4.633 0.256 -0.205 -0.045 -0.025 -0.198 -0.094
(1.745)*** (0.232) (0.372) (0.205) (0.116) (0.251) (0.201)
P. Employees 4.672 0.722 -3.938 2.861 0.531 1.419 0.211
(2.946) (0.393)* (0.625)*** (0.495)*** (0.199)*** (0.424)*** (0.339)
P. Technicians -0.392 -3.209 -2.429 0.981 -0.566 -1.076 -0.831
(4.457) (0.598)*** (0.970)*** (0.613) (0.293)** (0.643)* (0.512)*
P. Managers -2.397 3.280 0.250 0.126 0.263 0.133 0.269
(5.231) (0.697)*** (1.127) (0.799) (0.352) (0.754) (0.601)
P. Women 0.786 0.346 1.599 0.576 0.233 -2.454 1.894
(2.725) (0.364) (0.579)*** (0.338)* (0.185) (0.394)*** (0.313)***
P. Contract -6.903 0.732 2.811 1.059 0.343 1.220 -0.227
(5.559) (0.741) (1.182)** (0.680) (0.405) (0.804) (0.639)
Sectors (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10)
Constant -0.811 0.110 1.373 0.122 0.417 1.745 -0.177
(2.470) (0.332) (0.525)*** (0.297) (0.165)*** (0.357)*** (0.284)
Observations 1390 1376 1361 1080 1335 1384 1389
Adj R2 0.049 0.145 0.080 0.084 0.137 0.066 0.126
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.**Signiﬁcant at 5%.***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
55Heckman estimations
Estimations of equation (20): Determinants of the amount of labor ﬂows.
Table 21: Determinants of the amount of labor ﬂows. French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable: non null labor ﬂows for
MANAGERS INT.PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
COMPUTER -2.369 0.222 0.972 0.148 0.228 0.317 0.305
(2.324) (0.260) (0.420)** (0.220) (0.112)** (0.251) (0.196)
NET -0.969 0.110 -0.144 0.417 -0.107 -0.116 -0.177
(2.018) (0.233) (0.382) (0.199)** (0.102) (0.226) (0.176)
CHAIN -0.805 0.229 -0.346 -0.204 -0.053 -0.091 -0.083
(1.318) (0.142) (0.245) (0.113)* (0.062) (0.134) (0.106)
AUTONOMOUS 3.872 0.196 -0.176 -0.061 0.055 -0.091 0.201
(2.025)* (0.221) (0.384) (0.178) (0.098) (0.216) (0.169)
PROJECT 3.666 -0.214 -0.241 -0.386 -0.055 -0.118 -0.068
(1.942)* (0.220) (0.361) (0.189)** (0.097) (0.215) (0.168)
ROTATION -1.873 0.151 0.586 -0.115 0.123 0.267 0.162
(1.910) (0.207) (0.354)* (0.166) (0.091) (0.202) (0.157)
QUALITY -3.359 0.294 0.086 -0.056 -0.080 -0.179 0.212
(1.972)* (0.208) (0.342) (0.184) (0.089) (0.200) (0.155)
HIERARCHY 1.141 -0.212 -0.476 0.042 -0.058 -0.009 -0.078
(1.213) (0.132) (0.218)** (0.110) (0.057) (0.127) (0.099)
J.I.T. 1.432 -0.038 -0.057 0.096 0.028 0.091 0.023
(1.001) (0.112) (0.188) (0.090) (0.048) (0.108) (0.084)
Variation 0.466 0.201 0.065 0.013 0.118 -0.095 0.182
(1.705) (0.185) (0.311) (0.155) (0.081) (0.180) (0.138)
Strongly increasing -1.117 -0.398 -0.040 -0.195 -0.179 -0.256 -0.169
(2.466) (0.271) (0.456) (0.231) (0.119) (0.261) (0.201)
Decreasing 7.031 0.573 -0.156 -0.178 0.103 -0.139 0.475
(2.517)*** (0.292)** (0.476) (0.230) (0.122) (0.273) (0.040)***
Hours 5.449 0.258 -0.250 0.004 -0.018 -0.170 -0.088
(2.339)** (0.288) (0.448) (0.214) (0.116) (0.259) (0.201)
P. Employees 9.882 1.243 -5.606 2.701 0.557 1.540 0.248
(4.819)** (0.457)*** (0.777)*** (0.504)*** (0.199)*** (0.436)*** (0.341)
P. Technicians 2.308 -2.306 -3.878 0.491 -0.552 -0.925 -0.791
(6.284) (0.677)*** (1.174)*** (0.653) (0.295)* (0.662) (0.514)
P. Managers -2.390 4.139 -0.653 0.263 0.128 0.014 0.139
(6.963) (0.788)*** (1.341) (0.917) (0.352) (0.772) (0.602)
P. Women 2.063 0.310 2.184 0.292 0.211 -2.094 1.875
(4.236) (0.420) (0.714)*** (0.343) (0.185) (0.397)*** (0.316)***
P. Contract -8.387 1.409 2.933 0.868 0.375 1.414 -0.087
(9.246) (0.840)* (1.371)** (0.728) (0.406) (0.828)* (0.638)
Sectors (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10)
Constant -2.585 -1.012 1.996 0.088 0.351 1.105 -0.306
(3.919) (0.381)*** (0.702)*** (0.314) (0.164)** (0.350)*** (0.282)
For Sectors we write in parentheses the number of economic sectors included in the regression.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.**Signiﬁcant at 5%.***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
56Estimations of equation (21): Determinants of the presence of labor ﬂows.
Table 22: Determinants of the presence of labor ﬂows (probit model). French establishments 1998.
Dependent variable equals 1 if there are non null labor ﬂows
MANAGERS INT.PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
COMPUTER 0.033 0.073 0.042 0.180 0.097 0.040
(0.124) (0.085) (0.143) (0.232) (0.083) (0.086)
NET 0.126 0.039 0.339 0.159 -0.018 0.078
(0.117) (0.076) (0.133)*** (0.199) (0.090) (0.075)
INTERNET 0.031 0.028 -0.243 -1.028 -0.006 0.012
(0.249) (0.007)*** (0.247) (0.316)*** (0.019) (0.021)
CHAIN 0.194 0.079 0.152 -0.065 -0.024 0.061
(0.066)*** (0.046)* (0.069)** (0.114) (0.060) (0.046)
AUTONOMOUS -0.038 0.057 -0.131 0.433 -0.032 -0.035
(0.104) (0.072) (0.107) (0.201)** (0.075) (0.071)
PROJECT 0.026 -0.066 0.203 0.260 -0.047 0.042
(0.110) (0.072) (0.125) (0.175) (0.071) (0.070)
ROTATION 0.034 0.048 0.009 0.095 0.106 0.086
(0.097) (0.068) (0.102) (0.164) (0.067) (0.066)
QUALITY 0.053 0.099 -0.126 0.076 -0.030 0.047
(0.091) (0.068) (0.108) (0.150) (0.067) (0.067)
HIERARCHY 0.227 -0.065 0.042 0.033 0.000 0.012
(0.061)*** (0.043) (0.068) (0.104) (0.042) (0.042)
J.I.T. 0.042 -0.013 0.019 -0.075 0.030 0.020
(0.052) (0.037) (0.055) (0.090) (0.046) (0.035)
Union 0.190 0.002 -0.022 -0.083 0.003 0.129
(0.084)** (0.004) (0.095) (0.142) (0.004) (0.024)***
Variation 0.053 0.067 -0.027 0.081 -0.041 0.142
(0.087) (0.061) (0.094) (0.146) (0.063) (0.058)***
Tech. change -0.102 0.004 -0.079 -0.049 0.026 -0.103
(0.107) (0.004) (0.121) (0.188) (0.155) (0.006)***
Strongly increasing -0.189 -0.139 -0.068 0.011 -0.059 -0.289
(0.140) (0.089) (0.152) (0.273) (0.102) (0.085)***
Increasing -0.076 -0.006 0.088 -0.255 0.004 -0.112
(0.095) (0.003)** (0.109) (0.163) (0.002)** (0.012)***
Decreasing 0.079 0.175 0.013 -0.298 -0.027
(0.146) (0.094)* (0.153) (0.227) (0.108)
Strongly decreasing -0.014 -0.003 0.396 -0.280 0.032
(0.276) (0.009) (0.287) (0.416) (0.132)
Size 20-50 -0.755 -0.039 -0.621 -0.487 -0.185 -0.116
(0.137)*** (0.005)*** (0.149)*** (0.213)** (0.083)** (0.009)***
Size +500 0.710 0.049 0.655 0.369
(0.155)*** (0.004)*** (0.166)*** (0.229)
Hours -0.005 0.075 -0.050 -0.121 -0.092 -0.114
(0.128) (0.093) (0.134) (0.215) (0.106) (0.084)
P. Employees 0.734 0.396 1.643 0.151 0.526 0.043
(0.198)*** (0.149)*** (0.261)*** (0.398) (0.150)*** (0.149)
P. Technicians 0.783 -0.576 0.871 -0.248 -0.206 -0.254
(0.337)** (0.225)*** (0.375)** (0.523) (0.275) (0.214)
P. Managers 4.100 1.312 0.405 -0.862 -0.237 -0.334
(0.573)*** (0.258)*** (0.462) (0.664) (0.471) (0.254)
P. Women -0.077 0.091 0.299 0.044 -0.031 0.325
(0.194) (0.137) (0.221) (0.341) (0.175) (0.144)**
P. Contract 0.010 0.455 1.190 0.541 0.408 -0.035
(0.377) (0.275)* (0.527)** (0.688) (0.269) (0.265)
Sectors (16) (16) (16) (16) (16) (16)
Constant 0.887 -0.358 0.095 2.173 0.858 2.000
(0.626) (0.309) (0.748) (0.415)*** (0.228)*** (0.389)***
For Sectors we write in parentheses the number of economic sectors included in the regression.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.**Signiﬁcant at 5%.***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
57Table 23: Statistics associated to the Heckman procedure. French establishments 1998.
Statistics of the Heckman selection model for:
MANAGERS INT.PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
Observations 1388 1374 1359 1079 1335 1382 1387
Censored Observations 418 235 245 90 68 21
Uncensored Observations 970 1139 1114 989 1314 1366
Wald Â2 107.310 243.040 143.720 130.540 115.500 356.500
Prob> Â2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
½ -0.019 1.000 -0.016 -0.048 1.000 1.000
(0.066) (0.000) (0.078) (0.069) 0.000 0.000
Â2(1) 0.070 657.880 0.040 0.380 217.580 97.750
Prob> Â2 0.794 0.000 0.851 0.537 0.000 0.000
For Sectors we write in parentheses the number of economic sectors included in the regression.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
589 Appendix C: Descriptive statistics
Means and standard deviations
Table 24: Mean and standard deviation of variables in cross section analysis.
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviations
TOTAL 2024 0.741 2.213
MANAGERS 1825 0.764 18.800
INT. PROFES. 1720 0.697 2.835
EMPLOYEES 1803 0.921 4.323
WORKERS 1378 0.574 2.149
WOMEN 1979 1.081 4.338
MEN 1983 0.845 2.536
COMPUTER 2841 0.317 0.465
NET 2844 0.252 0.435
INTERNET 2844 0.069 0.254
CHAIN 2828 0.780 0.806
AUTONOMOUS 2844 0.192 0.394
PROJECT 2844 0.244 0.430
ROTATION 2833 0.252 0.434
QUALITY 2831 0.609 0.488
HIERARCHY 2789 0.931 0.728
J.I.T. 2760 0.722 0.852
Union 2844 0.392 0.488
Variation 2821 0.424 0.494
Tech. change 2837 0.185 0.388
Strongly increasing 2818 0.133 0.339
Increasing 2818 0.426 0.495
Decreasing 2818 0.118 0.322
Strongly decreasing 2818 0.022 0.147
Size 20-50 2844 0.252 0.434
Size +500 2844 0.124 0.329
Hours 2767 0.109 0.312
P. Employees 2430 0.362 1.453
P. Technicians 2252 0.270 2.593
P. Managers 2456 0.127 0.152
P. Women 2649 0.380 0.285
P. Contract 2628 0.058 0.114
Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
59Correlation matrix
Table 25: Correlation matrix.
MANAGERS INT. PROFES. EMPLOYEES WORKERS TOTAL WOMEN MEN
MANAGERS 1.000
INT. PROFES. -0.003 1.000
(0.887)
EMPLOYEES -0.001 0.199 1.000
(0.959) (0.000)
WORKERS 0.036 0.089 0.160 1.000
(0.187) (0.001) (0.000)
TOTAL 0.214 0.224 0.452 0.270 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
WOMEN 0.016 0.190 0.212 0.151 0.348 1.000
(0.516) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MEN 0.301 0.444 0.486 0.251 0.727 0.272 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
COMPUTER -0.016 -0.004 0.023 0.075 0.031 -0.026 0.014
(0.481) (0.854) (0.337) (0.005) (0.163) (0.249) (0.525)
NET -0.015 -0.024 -0.023 0.073 -0.044 -0.057 -0.060
(0.533) (0.320) (0.328) (0.007) (0.049) (0.012) (0.007)
CHAIN -0.028 -0.122 -0.116 -0.118 -0.149 -0.117 -0.152
(0.234) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AUTONOMOUS 0.046 -0.039 -0.031 -0.047 -0.042 -0.032 -0.013
(0.049) (0.108) (0.193) (0.079) (0.056) (0.153) (0.557)
PROJECT 0.039 0.002 0.007 -0.037 -0.023 0.008 -0.010
(0.092) (0.932) (0.765) (0.166) (0.304) (0.717) (0.666)
ROTATION -0.014 -0.039 0.001 -0.058 -0.029 -0.020 -0.014
(0.540) (0.102) (0.982) (0.033) (0.191) (0.380) (0.541)
QUALITY -0.037 -0.045 -0.046 -0.058 -0.103 -0.033 -0.034
(0.113) (0.063) (0.049) (0.031) (0.000) (0.147) (0.128)
HIERARCHY 0.032 -0.101 -0.080 -0.028 -0.043 -0.048 -0.064
(0.173) (0.000) (0.001) (0.300) (0.051) (0.033) (0.004)
J.I.T. 0.032 -0.0890 -0.058 -0.033 -0.039 -0.040 -0.057
(0.172) (0.000) (0.013) (0.223) (0.081) (0.078) (0.011)




CHAIN -0.012 0.086 1.000
(0.531) (0.000)
AUTONOMOUS -0.038 0.036 0.171 1.000
(0.042) (0.056) (0.000)
PROJECT 0.184 0.204 0.061 0.153 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ROTATION -0.107 -0.049 0.134 0.098 -0.004 1.000
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.822)
QUALITY -0.004 0.061 0.317 0.159 0.100 0.095 1.000
(0.841) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HIERARCHY 0.075 0.136 0.249 0.117 0.144 0.061 0.209
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
J.I.T. -0.081 -0.002 0.316 0.135 0.007 0.169 0.242






Source: REPONSE and DMMO surveys.
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